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FOREWORD

DIARMuID F. O'SCANNLAIN*

The papers in this symposium span a remarkable breadth,
taking on topics that range from moral and philosophical theories of criminal liability to empirical analyses of deterrence and
recidivism. Criminal punishment is an enduring subject worthy
of scholarly attention, and this volume happily extends from the
timeless principles of Aristotle and Aquinas to the contemporary
issues of white collar crime and novel constitutional limits on legislating morality. And indeed, the contributions here constitute
a forceful testament to the intellectual vitality of criminal law
scholarship. But, as the volume bespeaks, these issues are not
merely intellectual. Writing as a judge, even as an appellate
judge, I confess that perhaps no decision invokes-or ought to
invoke-greater fear and trembling for ajudge's soul than his or
her decision to mete out punishment or to affirm its imposition.
Those involved in administering justice in this world will, of
course, be called to account for each decision in the next. It is
appropriate and fitting, therefore, that ajournal whose foremost
intellectual commitment is the reconciliation of ethics and law
would tackle punishment as its symposium topic. I applaud the
contributors for treating the subject with the sobriety and moral
seriousness it requires.
I.

What then does the reader have in store? It is perhaps most
fitting to start with sacred scripture. In his fascinating piece, Professor George P. Fletcher explores the notions of guilt and
shame in biblical thought and their lessons for contemporary
criminal law. Among the questions he tackles is that of why we
employ the morally laden language of "guilt" to describe that
essential prerequisite for punishment. The puzzle arises, he suggests, because the decision to punish does not turn on the defen* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of my colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
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dant's subjective feeling and acknowledgment of guilt. Taking
his readers on a fascinating journey that begins with the creation
narrative in the Hebrew scriptures, he reveals how the concept of
guilt has involved both an external conception of guilt as well as
one more focused on the inner, human experience. The
impulse to punish, Professor Fletcher reasons, arises in large
measure from the external, objective conception of guilt as pollution-which can be symbolically cleansed, as the scriptures
reveal, by reparation and punishment.
In contemporary life no symbolic cleansing is more controversial than capital punishment, the subject of pieces by both
Professor Christian Brugger and Judge Rudolph Gerber. While
much of the American political discussion of capital punishment
arises from worries about verdict reliability and sentencing inconsistencies, Professor Brugger poses the more difficult question of
whether Aquinas's defense of justifiable intentional homicide
can bear the weight it has historically borne in undergirding the
traditional Catholic philosophical defense of capital punishment.
If, as Aquinas allows, the norm against killing admits of exceptions, Professor Brugger asks, what can justify the killing of the
guilty? By critiquing Aquinas's primary justifications, including
those relating to human dignity and the prerogatives of legitimate civil authority, Professor Brugger reasons, not immodestly,
that the traditional Western intellectual defense of capital punishment rests on a faulty foundation.
Judge Gerber, in contrast, draws less from philosophy and
more from economics, but reaches a similar result, concluding
that the game is not worth the candle. Deterrence is Judge
Gerber's object, and he draws on history and his experience as
an Arizona judge to evaluate how well capital punishment satisfies four prerequisites for effective deterrence, namely that punishment be executed swiftly, with certainty, that it be
proportionate, and that the punishment be performed publicly,
to disseminate the deterring message broadly. Examining each
criterion in turn, he argues that the modern implementation of
capital punishment is just the opposite: long-delayed when ultimately executed, unlikely to be imposed as a sentence, antiseptic,
and relatively private. Thus Judge Gerber, too, concludes that
the death penalty fails to fulfill its promise.
II.
Aside from capital punishment, a second issue very much in
the public eye is white collar crime. Its costs have become starkly
evident in the past few years, as corporate scandals have littered
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the economic landscape. In his prescient contribution, Professor
Stuart Green asks why so many white collar prosecutions target
conduct whose moral character is ambiguous. Routine street
crimes, in contrast, only rarely present genuine questions of
whether the proscribed conduct was wrongful. He proposes a
dozen factors that explain, in part, why moral ambiguity often
surrounds white collar criminal conduct, including the absence
of a mens rea requirement for strict liability crimes and the diffusion of responsibility in large business enterprises. The greatest
factor, he suggests, is the practical difficulty in distinguishing
between criminal behavior and aggressive-but acceptablebehavior in the white collar context. The important implication
of Professor Green's analysis is that, by understanding the
sources of this moral ambiguity, white collar criminal enforcement can be refined and sharpened to reduce such ambiguity,
rather than inviting decriminalization.
III.
A.
Two pieces examine the boundaries of the criminal justice
system, asking who properly falls within its scope. Professors
Gordon Bazemore, Leslie Leip, and Jeanne Stinchcomb present
a detailed study of truancy programs in an urban county in the
Southeastern United States. What they show is that criminal juvenile justice agencies are expanding outside their historic role and
taking on social control functions that would otherwise be considered the province of educators, religious and community institutions, and families. As juvenile offenders have more often
found themselves in adult courts, the juvenile justice system has
maintained its jurisdiction by "reaching down" to intervene in
deviant but non-criminal youth behavior that was previously
outside its reach. In many cases, they argue, expansion of the
formal justice system does more harm than good, weakening
community relationships and efforts to deal with the same
problems. But rather than advocating a criminal justice libertarianism, they argue that new forms of restorative justice in the educational and community context offer more promising
alternatives.
Student author Quinn Vandenberg examines another
boundary in criminal law: its intersection with immigration law in
the aftermath of the terrorism attacks of September 11, 2001.
After offering a brief history of central issues in immigration law,
Vandenberg takes as her focus recent statutory changes that
increase the crime-related grounds for deportability. In combi-
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nation with procedural and institutional changes, including the
assumption of immigration functions by the Department of
Homeland Security, Vandenberg argues that immigrants now live
in a "rights-deprived" environment. The criminal justice system
and the administrative immigration system need to have a heightened awareness of each other's policies. And yet, she stresses,
the potential for manipulation and injustice that arises from the
interaction between the two separate but increasingly interrelated legal regimes has increased.
B.
Two authors address a second issue of scope, asking not how
the law treats certain persons, but rather inquiring into whether
certain conduct should be forbidden. Senator Orrin Hatch, a
longtime advocate of stricter child pornography and exploitation
laws, decries the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition,1 in which the Court struck down provisions of
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 19962 as violative of the
First Amendment. Those provisions forbade production and
viewing of virtual child pornography, that is, pornography made
using computer-imaging technology. In response to a suggestion
in Justice Thomas's concurrence, which argues that the government should not be foreclosed from prosecuting child pornography laws if technology reaches the point where "real" and
"virtual" pornography is indistinguishable,' Senator Hatch
describes the subsequent passage of legislation that, he hopes,
will succeed in better protecting children.
Professor Keith Burgess-Jackson's reflection on the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas4 continues the philosophical debate on the legitimacy of morals legislation. This debate,
of course, was famously popularized in the Hart-Devlin debates,
and continues to this day. As Professor Burgess-Jackson explains,
John Stuart Mill urged that prevention of harm to others constitutes the only legitimate basis for limiting liberty. Thus, prevention of harm to oneself, prevention of offense to others, and
prevention of harmless wrongdoing were all beyond the state's
reach. If the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,5
which upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy laws, stood for the legitimacy of legal moralism, the Lawrence decision, Professor Burgess1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
Id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).

20041

FOREWORD

Jackson suggests, embraces a Millian vision of the Constitution.
According to Professor Burgess-Jackson, Justice Scalia's prediction that Lawrence "effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation"' follows from Justice Kennedy's language, which
resonates with Millian overtones. IfJustice Scalia is correct, Lawrence represents a seismic change in the scope of what the state
can punish.
IV.
Two pieces address restorative justice explicitly, taking different tacks. Before we reach those two pieces, however, Professor Abbe Smith provides important context in her deeply
personal account of being a criminal defense attorney. In her
twenty years of criminal practice, she notes, the crimes have not
changed; the sentences, though, have grown much more severe.
She describes the consequences of what she calls "the national
obsession with punishment," focusing not only on the destruction of families and communities, but also on the hardening and
social withdrawal of prisoners serving longer and longer
sentences. One cannot but wonder, after reading Professor
Smith's piece, what can be done?
Chuck Colson and Pat Nolan believe one answer is restorative justice, and they too write from powerful personal experiences, though as federal inmates, not as the lawyers they once
were. Their piece challenges the dominant view of crime as
offenses committed principally against the state, rather than
against the injured victim. Their contribution-indeed, their
life's work-explores how best to reform the lives of the more
than two million Americans currently incarcerated, and the
unfortunate reality that two-thirds of released inmates are rearrested within three years. Arguing that crime's cause is bad
moral decision-making, they share the important work of Prison
Fellowship Ministries and, in particular, the success of its
InnerChange Freedom Initiative, which now operates in four
states. By emphasizing the role of faith and moral formation in
otherwise spiritually void prisons, the Initiative, they report, has
significantly improved prisoner rehabilitation rates and, correspondingly, reduced recidivism rates among program participants. As they explain, one of the program's foremost exercises
involves prisoners learning from crime victims and, in doing so,
beginning to understand and to assume responsibility for the
injuries they have caused.
6.

123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Moving from the particular to the theoretical, student
author Christa Obold-Eshleman explores the relationship
between restorative justice and the victims' rights movement.
She argues that restorative justice is based upon a "relational
worldview," whereby relationships among people are foremost,
and in which crime disrupts well-ordered relationships. This
contrasts, she suggests, with the traditional criminal law's-and
the victims' rights movement's -more
individualistic and
organic worldviews, that focus respectively on individual autonomy and the defense of the community. In a lengthy exposition,
Obold-Eshleman warns that by failing to understand restorative
justice's alternative premise, the concept can too easily be captured by the traditional regime, for example, by conversion into
merely a sentencing tool. The promise of restorative justice, she
believes, is far greater, but requires embracing a relational
approach to criminal justice. Often, she stresses, this means recognizing that the line between victim and offender is more
blurred than the idealized portrait often presented in some of
the key victims' rights tracts.
V.
Let me conclude by pointing out three fine pieces of theoretical import. Professor Kyron Huigens probes whether a comprehensive theory of punishment is possible and, if so, what it
might look like. His piece is an explicit response to Antony Duff,
who has urged a healthy dose of skepticism about the project of
developing a single model of criminal liability, advocating
instead for an eclectic mix of interrelated models.7 Professor
Huigens first defends the possibility of a grand theory in criminal
law, arguing that the source of much skepticism arises from critics' misunderstanding the relationship between theory's normative and descriptive components. Properly understood, he
argues, criminal theory need not be procrustean. He then asks
what such a comprehensive theory might look like, and defends
his longstanding interest in a virtue ethics-based theory of punishment, or so-called aretaic legal theory.
What justifies the authority to impose punishment? This
question, asked by Professor Daniel N. Robinson, is even more
basic than identifying what constitutes proportional punishment
or how one might objectively calibrate punishment to a certain
offense. How, specifically, can state authority to punish be justified? Professor Robinson develops a Kantian theory that state
7. R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian
Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 147 (2003).
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authority isjustified insofar as it acts as a proxy for those to whom
a wrong is done. But because the victim may not seek only what
is right, the state stands as a proxy for the populace's ideals, for
"their morally best selves." After fleshing out his theory in the
context of punishment by the state, Professor Robinson explores
the symmetrical question of how the state can forgive on behalf
of others.
And third, Professor Russell Christopher attacks a discrete
but perplexing issue of theory: the punishment differential
between attempt and completed offenses. This is the so-called
question of moral luck. According to Professor Christopher,
both proponents and opponents of the punishment differential
rely upon a faulty premise: their assumption that the achievement of the prohibited result is the only factor that can distinguish the two scenarios. Drawing on the work of Leo Katz,
Professor Christopher presents several hypotheticals to demonstrate that a perpetrator who then seeks to prevent or undo the
very harm he sought to cause may deserve lesser punishment.
This accords with affirmative notions of duty to help, according
to Professor Christopher.
VI.
Without further introduction, I invite you now to turn to the
pages here assembled. They present, as I believe you will discover, a rich array of scholarship and learning. It is work befitting the Journal that presents it.

